Somalia! By Any Manner of Means
Ismail Ali Ismail
24 January 2007
“In friendship false, implacable in hate:
Resolv’d to ruin or to rule the state.”
Dryden
Background
Few, if any, will doubt that the above quotation is an apt description of our Somali war-lords. It may be argued that the war-lords, scavenging on the remains of our ruined State, were the product of a vacuum created by the inability of the clan- based liberation fronts to come together and lay new foundations for a state which would be in accord with their own vision. Alas, they had no vision of their own beyond sweeping out the regime of Siad Barre, and did not, apparently, foresee the necessity of forging a state together.
The task of toppling a deeply entrenched dictatorial and repressive regime was, obviously, so absorbing that it eclipsed all that was supposed to follow its successful accomplishment. In the event, confusion reigned as happens in all such situations. The gruesome events that followed the demise of the Bourbons in the French Revolution (1789) were termed “ The Reign of Terror”. And there were two ‘kinds’ of terror in Ethiopia following the so-called ‘creeping revolution’ of the Dergue that overthrew the aged and senile Emperor Haile Sellassie in 1974. The Dergue manged to settle in authority only after shedding so much blood in 1976 and 1977 through its massive campaign of “Red Terror” conducted under the pretext of countering a “White Terror” unleashed by its opponents.
By contrast, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF for short) entered Addis Ababa in May 1991 in a very methodical, organized and (to a large extent) peaceful manner. They came in one late afternoon and, except for sporadic gun fire, Addis Ababa fell quietly. It was amazing: the final stage of regime change in Ethiopia seemed orderly and orchestrated, and it looked as if we were simply witnessing a change of the guard. It is important to remember, for the purpose of analysis, that the EPRDF was an umbrella organization comprising: (a) Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization; (b) Amhara National Democratic Movement; (c) South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front; and (d) Tigrean Peoples’ Liberation Front. Clearly, they were all, like ours, ethnically based. Incidentally, I happened to witness all these vicissitudes.
Ours movements were: (a) the SSDF of Darood; (b) the SNM of Isaaq; (c) the USC of Hawiye; and (d) SPM of
Darood. Although it seemed that they all shared the common goal of overthrowing the Siad Barre regime they themselves were not really on speaking terms and did not trust each other. Even Aideed and Abdullahi Yusuf, long time comrades in arms, friends of long standing, colleagues and cell-mates in their long incarceration could be seen in the corridors of the Ghion in Addis Ababa trading hateful glances, not because they had personal grievances against each other but because one was Darood and the other Hawiye. Such unfortunate circumstances stood in the way of forming an umbrella organization to coordinate the policies and streamline the fighting strategies of the Somali movements. A major contributory factor to the collapse of the Somali State was also the disintegration of its military even before the regime finally crumbled.
Ali Mahdi was proclaimed President in Magadishu by a small group who gathered around him immediately after the downfall of the regime. But he was confirmed later by the first Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 1991. The problem, however, was that Aideed would not let anyone other than himself have the presidency and fighting ensued between Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The conflict continued and war-lords mushroomed. Later on, Aideed proclaimed himself President and established a broad-based government called “sal-ballaadh” which contained elements from all clans but was not recognized. But the conflict did not stop and Aideed fell in the process.
In 2000 the TNG was born of another reconciliation meeting, also in Djibouti. Abdulqassim Salaad was elected, through a free and fair and transparent process, as President and gained thereby international legitimacy but was unable to bring the war-lords within the fold of his government; nor was he able to unite and bring the capital city under the control of his Administration.
Now there is the TFG which was born of a two-year arduous process of interclan consultations, negotiations and haggling as a result of which a Parliament was formed and Abdullahi Yusuf was elected as the transitional President of the Republic in a process that was also free and fair and transparent. But the TFG had no resources, no army or police, and was unable to settle in the capital where everyone was fighting everyone else including the war-lords who had been appointed ministers but were still wreaking havoc in the city; it also had too many enemies from within and without who spared no effort to bring it down. And then of course there was that vulpine Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, who could not lead his Parliament but always remained a thorn on the side of government’s flesh because of his scheming nature and continual encroachments upon its territory. The Sharif , although Speaker of Parliament, was heart and soul with the forces of discord, of disunity, of death and darkness – the war-lords who broke away from the government. And after he and the President patched their differences it did not take him too long to decamp to the ICU. By running with the hares and the hunting with the hounds the Sharif laid bare the true nature of his character which finally led to him being voted as Speaker of Parliament. Such a character cannot be an asset to any side of the political divide.
These adverse circumstances notwithstanding the TFG was required to bear the heavy burden of reconciliation single-handedly and to install a federal system within a matter of only two years in a country that was tearing itself apart. And of course it could not have acquitted itself of these tasks. Sadly, even some of our so-called intellectuals were and still remain only too eager to criticize, to ridicule and to point to the ineffectiveness of the TFG. But what have these bystanders themselves done to help their country? Any one possessed of normal intellectual faculties can understand that only a robust (not weak) government can undertake the monumental tasks of bringing about peace, reconciliation and the restoration of services.
The Advent of Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU)
Last year the Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU) appeared out of nowhere on the scene of conflict in Mogadishu and, inevitably, went into head-on collisions with the multiplicity of long-established war-lords. Fortunately, they prevailed and sent the war-lords fleeing to the four corners of the earth; then they cleared the city of all the malcontents: road-blockers, thieves, robbers, rapists, prostitutes, etc. They restored peace in full measure – a badly needed service which the TFG sitting in Baidoa could not, obviously, provide by the use of remote control. Even houses illegally occupied were restored to their rightful owners without fuss or quibble. Indeed that was the time I should have gone to Mogadishu to reclaim my house which has been illegally occupied throughout this long period of turmoil.
Under the control of the ICU Mogadishu was transformed overnight from a burning hell to a haven of peace. And the womenfolk took upon themselves to clean the streets off the garbage and filth that had accumulated. In the olden days, Mogadishu used to be praised by its foreign visitors for being clean, peaceful, friendly and reasonably cheap. Despite the rabble and the destruction of buildings and physical infrastructure the ICU restored to the city the main essentials of its original features. Anyone who had veritable Somali blood running in his veins must have then felt proud of ICU’s singular achievements.
The ICU, by its sudden appearance and its achievements, gave a jolt to the legal government sitting in Baidoa but moved quickly to assure it of recognition and collaboration. We all read that assurance as the beginning of an approaching end of hostilities in the country, and a flurry of diplomatic activities brought the two sides (TFG and ICU) together in Khartoum.
Opportunities Lost
The first round of Khartoum was not only encouraging but also euphoric. The two parties met like brothers who have not met for a long time and were too eager to meet. The hugs, the kissings, the broad smiles, the gigglings and the exchange of jokes and kind words, all pointed towards successful negotiation. When they settled down to serious business, however, their differences surfaced up. The TFG wanted to discuss the political issues first and then go into the question of power sharing, The ICU wanted to discuss the issue of ‘security’ first and, having settled that, come to the political issues and, subsequently, power sharing, The TFG was of the view that once political issues have been agreed upon and power sharing achieved the security issues would even cease to be issues for obvious reasons. In the event the two sides agreed only to meet again after consultations with their respective superiors. But the meeting ended on a good note.
However, the ICU started expanding to the areas adjoining the capital and continued even further into the hinterland until one day they dared make an incursion into Bur Hakaba – a mere ----kms. to Baidoa – an event which raised alarm in the TFG causing it to call for Ethiopian reinforcements to deter the ICU. The ICU was incensed at the sight of Ethiopian forces on Somali territory which provided them with an excuse to break the negotiation. But the two sides went nevertheless to Khartoum for the second round but the ICU refused to go into the meeting hall unless Ethiopian forces first withdrew from Somali soil. The TFG retaliated by demanding that the ICU relinquish all the territories it had occupied since the previous meeting. A further but relatively minor complication was also that the ICU objected to IGAD (particularly Kenya) being involved in the mediation, and the TFG objected in turn to the Arab League and Sudan. Had the mediators done their homework such embarrassing developments would have bee avoided. In the event, the mediators could not manage to bring the two parties to one table, and the meeting was adjourned sine die.
The first and second rounds of Khartoum represented golden opportunities that have been squandered and lost. As a matter of fact the ICU had on both occasions the advantage of negotiating from a point of strength. Yet, it was they who squandered both opportunities.
ICU Mistakes And Miscalculations
It is a self-evident fact the ICU made a number of mistakes; and the first mistake related to the composition of its leadership; for its most visible leaders belonged to the same subclan and even the same sub-subclan. It was a mistake on their part to think that religion transcended affiliation and loyalty to the clan particularly, as in their case, where religion and politics were enmeshed. Because of this, many Somalis thought that the ICU contained the seed of its own destruction. The second mistake was its public expression of sentiments regarding the unity, not only of Somalis but also of Moslems in the Horn of Africa as a whole. In Africa there is little, if any, difference between an expression of sentiment and a statement of policy and the pronouncements of ICU sent danger signals to both Ethiopia and Kenya both of which have substantial Somali and Moslem populations. When a regime emerges from the ashes of civil war or as a result of coup d’etat the first thing to do is to assure one’s neighbours of peace and good neighbourliness, and the rest of the world that international treaties and agreements would be observed and respected. The third mistake was to give an ultimatum to Ethiopia and embark on a campaign of rapid expansion to all southern areas culminating in laying siege to the headquarters of the TFG.
The ICU was apparently a collection of religious zealots – a religious fraternity perhaps – who were evidently unschooled in state-craft. They sought to impose on the nation their own vision of an Islamic state but did not know the politics and the mechanics – the nitty-gritty, if you like – of translating their dream into reality.
Restoring Somalia: Does the End Justify the Means?
The TFG, with an ICU knife on its throat, had no option but to defend itself and even call for Ethiopian help and the Ethiopians came with overwhelming military might and helped to crush the ICU militia within a matter of days; and the ICU vanished into thin air. So many thousands of innocent lives have been tragically lost to a reckless military adventure. But that tragedy marks the end of an epoch and the beginning of another. It marks the end of an era of armed confrontations and statelessness and lawlessness and ushers in, hopefully, an era of reconciliation, statehood and stability. As optimists in the Churchillian sense we must find an opportunity in our calamity so that we can move forward towards peace and stability. It is a responsibility we owe to posterity. And we should not flinch from it.
To be fair the TFG had from the very start foreseen the necessity for an African force to be deployed in the country. But, there was stiff opposition from the war-lords, who themselves were cabinet ministers, and the speaker of parliament, who went to great lengths in conniving with them to thwart government policies; it was fiercely opposed even after it was agreed to exclude the neighbouring countries from such a force. The ICG, benefiting from our continuing crisis as usual, fought tooth and nail against such a move. And the ICU, a late-comer to the scene, swore to fight any external force. Furthermore, the Europeans and the Americans said the move was a bad idea and the countries that had promised to contribute to the force developed cold feet. The UN Security Council also prolonged the crisis by playing dilatory tactics but finally ‘lifted’ an arms embargo that was never enforced in the first place. But, curiously enough, there were those among us Somalis who demonstrated a few days ago against the nominal lifting of the embargo but had not even lifted a voice in favour of its enforcement. Why protest against lifting a measure that had not been working anyway? The key to our continuing crisis has always been in our hands but we have permitted others to use it because we ourselves
could not or did not use it.
Only time will tell whether the Ethiopian intervention was good or bad, but the mere fact that it is Ethiopia (and not another country) which intervened created shock waves in many quarters. The reactions have been generally hostile. It is so because Ethiopia is a country many of us still love to hate and is still seen as a “traditional” enemy. I was once told by a Tanzanian lady working for the OAU in Addis Ababa that according to her observation Somalis hated Ethiopians but that Ethiopians did not hate Somalis, and she asked why. I told her of course that Ethiopians connived with the British while we slept, stole our land and ruled our people in the most savage and repressive manner and that that was something that we never did to them. She was satisfied.
But Ethiopia has changed, despite claims to the contrary; and we have changed; and the world around us has changed. For the historical and attitudinal changes which I have personally witnessed in Ethiopia pleased refer to my article in the Wardheernews.com which was published under the date of 06 July 2005 under the caption of “Ethiopia and Somalia: Missed Opportunities and Some Challenges”. Surely, the march of history did not stop in Ethiopia in the 19th or even the 20th century. Nor did it stop in Somalia: look at the changes that occurred to us! Despite our misplaced pride, our homogeneity and our progress in many fields of human endeavour we have deteriorated to a nation in tatters and what the Ethiopians did for us should be viewed as a charity from a kindly neighbour. Our flag was burned only the other day in Hageisa by none other than Somalis; and in full view of a multitude of other Somalis protesting against being Somali – Somalis who would be much happier to be Ethiopians. It is incredible but true! That day will be “ … a day that shall live in infamy”, to borrow the words of Roosevelt. The Ethiopians could have afforded diplomatic recognition to our breakaway region in the Northwest and even lobbied for it with other African countries and AU but were kind enough not to do it. The old Ethiopia (including Mengistu Haile Mariam) would not have hesitated a second to do it.
I think it is completely justifiable to stabalise the country by the use of an external force, and if that force was destined to be Ethiopian, so be it. Now the Ethiopians are withdrawing and there is, all of a sudden, clamour for an African force to replace them. Without a government, without a state, and the paraphernalia of a state, our nationalism will only remain spurious, and we will not be able to raise our heads and walk proudly among free peoples everywhere. Everything therefore must be subordinated to the overriding purpose of getting our Somalia back by any manner of means.
Opportunity Restored
The question facing us now is: where do we go from here now that there is an internationally recognized government sitting for the first time in a long time in our national capital? Do we destroy it or build on it? The TFG has been warming up to the advice rendered by various quarters that it should begin reconciliation in earnest and begin negotiations with its own adversary, the ICU. But there are contradictory signals from the latter: those leaders of the ICU who went underground have vowed to launch a ‘campaign of resistance’; the others who took refuge in Kenya and the Yemen have expressed their readiness to negotiate. There is real chance for a rapprochement which should not be missed.
However, let us not underestimate the very wide conceptual gap that separates the two sides. Though the TFG may very well negotiate from a point of strength it is scarcely likely that the ICU will give much ground. But with skillful handling of the negotiations it is not altogether impossible for the parties to reach a common ground and thereby spare us yet another round of armed conflict which will drive us and our well-wishers to despair. It is inconceivable and unacceptable that those rogue and unscrupulous warlords are accommodated by the TFG while the ICU luminaries, with all the good deeds that speak for them, are thrown to the wolves. The TFG should seriously consider, inter alia, the setting up of a powerful Council of Religious Affairs with a clear mandate and stipendiary positions in order to accommodate the scholars of the ICU. I do earnestly hope that wiser counsels will prevail and that an amalgam of TFG/ICU Administration will emerge.
I am optimistic – and incorrigibly so – that sense will prevail and we will soon be talking about the reconstruction of our ship of state which will probably be renamed as the “Islamic Republic of Somalia”. We will pin our hopes on that ship of state and will then have reason to utter in our own gabay – or even sing in Somali – the following lines of Longfellow’s:
“Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!
Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate! “
Somalia! By Any Manner of Means
Ismail Ali Ismail
24 January 2007
“In friendship false, implacable in hate:
Resolv’d to ruin or to rule the state.”
Dryden
Background
Few, if any, will doubt that the above quotation is an apt description of our Somali war-lords. It may be argued that the war-lords, scavenging on the remains of our ruined State, were the product of a vacuum created by the inability of the clan- based liberation fronts to come together and lay new foundations for a state which would be in accord with their own vision. Alas, they had no vision of their own beyond sweeping out the regime of Siad Barre, and did not, apparently, foresee the necessity of forging a state together.
The task of toppling a deeply entrenched dictatorial and repressive regime was, obviously, so absorbing that it eclipsed all that was supposed to follow its successful accomplishment. In the event, confusion reigned as happens in all such situations. The gruesome events that followed the demise of the Bourbons in the French Revolution (1789) were termed “ The Reign of Terror”. And there were two ‘kinds’ of terror in Ethiopia following the so-called ‘creeping revolution’ of the Dergue that overthrew the aged and senile Emperor Haile Sellassie in 1974. The Dergue manged to settle in authority only after shedding so much blood in 1976 and 1977 through its massive campaign of “Red Terror” conducted under the pretext of countering a “White Terror” unleashed by its opponents.
By contrast, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF for short) entered Addis Ababa in May 1991 in a very methodical, organized and (to a large extent) peaceful manner. They came in one late afternoon and, except for sporadic gun fire, Addis Ababa fell quietly. It was amazing: the final stage of regime change in Ethiopia seemed orderly and orchestrated, and it looked as if we were simply witnessing a change of the guard. It is important to remember, for the purpose of analysis, that the EPRDF was an umbrella organization comprising: (a) Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization; (b) Amhara National Democratic Movement; (c) South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front; and (d) Tigrean Peoples’ Liberation Front. Clearly, they were all, like ours, ethnically based. Incidentally, I happened to witness all these vicissitudes.
Ours movements were: (a) the SSDF of Darood; (b) the SNM of Isaaq; (c) the USC of Hawiye; and (d) SPM of
Darood. Although it seemed that they all shared the common goal of overthrowing the Siad Barre regime they themselves were not really on speaking terms and did not trust each other. Even Aideed and Abdullahi Yusuf, long time comrades in arms, friends of long standing, colleagues and cell-mates in their long incarceration could be seen in the corridors of the Ghion in Addis Ababa trading hateful glances, not because they had personal grievances against each other but because one was Darood and the other Hawiye. Such unfortunate circumstances stood in the way of forming an umbrella organization to coordinate the policies and streamline the fighting strategies of the Somali movements. A major contributory factor to the collapse of the Somali State was also the disintegration of its military even before the regime finally crumbled.
Ali Mahdi was proclaimed President in Magadishu by a small group who gathered around him immediately after the downfall of the regime. But he was confirmed later by the first Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 1991. The problem, however, was that Aideed would not let anyone other than himself have the presidency and fighting ensued between Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The conflict continued and war-lords mushroomed. Later on, Aideed proclaimed himself President and established a broad-based government called “sal-ballaadh” which contained elements from all clans but was not recognized. But the conflict did not stop and Aideed fell in the process.
In 2000 the TNG was born of another reconciliation meeting, also in Djibouti. Abdulqassim Salaad was elected, through a free and fair and transparent process, as President and gained thereby international legitimacy but was unable to bring the war-lords within the fold of his government; nor was he able to unite and bring the capital city under the control of his Administration.
Now there is the TFG which was born of a two-year arduous process of interclan consultations, negotiations and haggling as a result of which a Parliament was formed and Abdullahi Yusuf was elected as the transitional President of the Republic in a process that was also free and fair and transparent. But the TFG had no resources, no army or police, and was unable to settle in the capital where everyone was fighting everyone else including the war-lords who had been appointed ministers but were still wreaking havoc in the city; it also had too many enemies from within and without who spared no effort to bring it down. And then of course there was that vulpine Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, who could not lead his Parliament but always remained a thorn on the side of government’s flesh because of his scheming nature and continual encroachments upon its territory. The Sharif , although Speaker of Parliament, was heart and soul with the forces of discord, of disunity, of death and darkness – the war-lords who broke away from the government. And after he and the President patched their differences it did not take him too long to decamp to the ICU. By running with the hares and the hunting with the hounds the Sharif laid bare the true nature of his character which finally led to him being voted as Speaker of Parliament. Such a character cannot be an asset to any side of the political divide.
These adverse circumstances notwithstanding the TFG was required to bear the heavy burden of reconciliation single-handedly and to install a federal system within a matter of only two years in a country that was tearing itself apart. And of course it could not have acquitted itself of these tasks. Sadly, even some of our so-called intellectuals were and still remain only too eager to criticize, to ridicule and to point to the ineffectiveness of the TFG. But what have these bystanders themselves done to help their country? Any one possessed of normal intellectual faculties can understand that only a robust (not weak) government can undertake the monumental tasks of bringing about peace, reconciliation and the restoration of services.
The Advent of Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU)
Last year the Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU) appeared out of nowhere on the scene of conflict in Mogadishu and, inevitably, went into head-on collisions with the multiplicity of long-established war-lords. Fortunately, they prevailed and sent the war-lords fleeing to the four corners of the earth; then they cleared the city of all the malcontents: road-blockers, thieves, robbers, rapists, prostitutes, etc. They restored peace in full measure – a badly needed service which the TFG sitting in Baidoa could not, obviously, provide by the use of remote control. Even houses illegally occupied were restored to their rightful owners without fuss or quibble. Indeed that was the time I should have gone to Mogadishu to reclaim my house which has been illegally occupied throughout this long period of turmoil.
Under the control of the ICU Mogadishu was transformed overnight from a burning hell to a haven of peace. And the womenfolk took upon themselves to clean the streets off the garbage and filth that had accumulated. In the olden days, Mogadishu used to be praised by its foreign visitors for being clean, peaceful, friendly and reasonably cheap. Despite the rabble and the destruction of buildings and physical infrastructure the ICU restored to the city the main essentials of its original features. Anyone who had veritable Somali blood running in his veins must have then felt proud of ICU’s singular achievements.
The ICU, by its sudden appearance and its achievements, gave a jolt to the legal government sitting in Baidoa but moved quickly to assure it of recognition and collaboration. We all read that assurance as the beginning of an approaching end of hostilities in the country, and a flurry of diplomatic activities brought the two sides (TFG and ICU) together in Khartoum.
Opportunities Lost
The first round of Khartoum was not only encouraging but also euphoric. The two parties met like brothers who have not met for a long time and were too eager to meet. The hugs, the kissings, the broad smiles, the gigglings and the exchange of jokes and kind words, all pointed towards successful negotiation. When they settled down to serious business, however, their differences surfaced up. The TFG wanted to discuss the political issues first and then go into the question of power sharing, The ICU wanted to discuss the issue of ‘security’ first and, having settled that, come to the political issues and, subsequently, power sharing, The TFG was of the view that once political issues have been agreed upon and power sharing achieved the security issues would even cease to be issues for obvious reasons. In the event the two sides agreed only to meet again after consultations with their respective superiors. But the meeting ended on a good note.
However, the ICU started expanding to the areas adjoining the capital and continued even further into the hinterland until one day they dared make an incursion into Bur Hakaba – a mere ----kms. to Baidoa – an event which raised alarm in the TFG causing it to call for Ethiopian reinforcements to deter the ICU. The ICU was incensed at the sight of Ethiopian forces on Somali territory which provided them with an excuse to break the negotiation. But the two sides went nevertheless to Khartoum for the second round but the ICU refused to go into the meeting hall unless Ethiopian forces first withdrew from Somali soil. The TFG retaliated by demanding that the ICU relinquish all the territories it had occupied since the previous meeting. A further but relatively minor complication was also that the ICU objected to IGAD (particularly Kenya) being involved in the mediation, and the TFG objected in turn to the Arab League and Sudan. Had the mediators done their homework such embarrassing developments would have bee avoided. In the event, the mediators could not manage to bring the two parties to one table, and the meeting was adjourned sine die.
The first and second rounds of Khartoum represented golden opportunities that have been squandered and lost. As a matter of fact the ICU had on both occasions the advantage of negotiating from a point of strength. Yet, it was they who squandered both opportunities.
ICU Mistakes And Miscalculations
It is a self-evident fact the ICU made a number of mistakes; and the first mistake related to the composition of its leadership; for its most visible leaders belonged to the same subclan and even the same sub-subclan. It was a mistake on their part to think that religion transcended affiliation and loyalty to the clan particularly, as in their case, where religion and politics were enmeshed. Because of this, many Somalis thought that the ICU contained the seed of its own destruction. The second mistake was its public expression of sentiments regarding the unity, not only of Somalis but also of Moslems in the Horn of Africa as a whole. In Africa there is little, if any, difference between an expression of sentiment and a statement of policy and the pronouncements of ICU sent danger signals to both Ethiopia and Kenya both of which have substantial Somali and Moslem populations. When a regime emerges from the ashes of civil war or as a result of coup d’etat the first thing to do is to assure one’s neighbours of peace and good neighbourliness, and the rest of the world that international treaties and agreements would be observed and respected. The third mistake was to give an ultimatum to Ethiopia and embark on a campaign of rapid expansion to all southern areas culminating in laying siege to the headquarters of the TFG.
The ICU was apparently a collection of religious zealots – a religious fraternity perhaps – who were evidently unschooled in state-craft. They sought to impose on the nation their own vision of an Islamic state but did not know the politics and the mechanics – the nitty-gritty, if you like – of translating their dream into reality.
Restoring Somalia: Does the End Justify the Means?
The TFG, with an ICU knife on its throat, had no option but to defend itself and even call for Ethiopian help and the Ethiopians came with overwhelming military might and helped to crush the ICU militia within a matter of days; and the ICU vanished into thin air. So many thousands of innocent lives have been tragically lost to a reckless military adventure. But that tragedy marks the end of an epoch and the beginning of another. It marks the end of an era of armed confrontations and statelessness and lawlessness and ushers in, hopefully, an era of reconciliation, statehood and stability. As optimists in the Churchillian sense we must find an opportunity in our calamity so that we can move forward towards peace and stability. It is a responsibility we owe to posterity. And we should not flinch from it.
To be fair the TFG had from the very start foreseen the necessity for an African force to be deployed in the country. But, there was stiff opposition from the war-lords, who themselves were cabinet ministers, and the speaker of parliament, who went to great lengths in conniving with them to thwart government policies; it was fiercely opposed even after it was agreed to exclude the neighbouring countries from such a force. The ICG, benefiting from our continuing crisis as usual, fought tooth and nail against such a move. And the ICU, a late-comer to the scene, swore to fight any external force. Furthermore, the Europeans and the Americans said the move was a bad idea and the countries that had promised to contribute to the force developed cold feet. The UN Security Council also prolonged the crisis by playing dilatory tactics but finally ‘lifted’ an arms embargo that was never enforced in the first place. But, curiously enough, there were those among us Somalis who demonstrated a few days ago against the nominal lifting of the embargo but had not even lifted a voice in favour of its enforcement. Why protest against lifting a measure that had not been working anyway? The key to our continuing crisis has always been in our hands but we have permitted others to use it because we ourselves
could not or did not use it.
Only time will tell whether the Ethiopian intervention was good or bad, but the mere fact that it is Ethiopia (and not another country) which intervened created shock waves in many quarters. The reactions have been generally hostile. It is so because Ethiopia is a country many of us still love to hate and is still seen as a “traditional” enemy. I was once told by a Tanzanian lady working for the OAU in Addis Ababa that according to her observation Somalis hated Ethiopians but that Ethiopians did not hate Somalis, and she asked why. I told her of course that Ethiopians connived with the British while we slept, stole our land and ruled our people in the most savage and repressive manner and that that was something that we never did to them. She was satisfied.
But Ethiopia has changed, despite claims to the contrary; and we have changed; and the world around us has changed. For the historical and attitudinal changes which I have personally witnessed in Ethiopia pleased refer to my article in the Wardheernews.com which was published under the date of 06 July 2005 under the caption of “Ethiopia and Somalia: Missed Opportunities and Some Challenges”. Surely, the march of history did not stop in Ethiopia in the 19th or even the 20th century. Nor did it stop in Somalia: look at the changes that occurred to us! Despite our misplaced pride, our homogeneity and our progress in many fields of human endeavour we have deteriorated to a nation in tatters and what the Ethiopians did for us should be viewed as a charity from a kindly neighbour. Our flag was burned only the other day in Hageisa by none other than Somalis; and in full view of a multitude of other Somalis protesting against being Somali – Somalis who would be much happier to be Ethiopians. It is incredible but true! That day will be “ … a day that shall live in infamy”, to borrow the words of Roosevelt. The Ethiopians could have afforded diplomatic recognition to our breakaway region in the Northwest and even lobbied for it with other African countries and AU but were kind enough not to do it. The old Ethiopia (including Mengistu Haile Mariam) would not have hesitated a second to do it.
I think it is completely justifiable to stabalise the country by the use of an external force, and if that force was destined to be Ethiopian, so be it. Now the Ethiopians are withdrawing and there is, all of a sudden, clamour for an African force to replace them. Without a government, without a state, and the paraphernalia of a state, our nationalism will only remain spurious, and we will not be able to raise our heads and walk proudly among free peoples everywhere. Everything therefore must be subordinated to the overriding purpose of getting our Somalia back by any manner of means.
Opportunity Restored
The question facing us now is: where do we go from here now that there is an internationally recognized government sitting for the first time in a long time in our national capital? Do we destroy it or build on it? The TFG has been warming up to the advice rendered by various quarters that it should begin reconciliation in earnest and begin negotiations with its own adversary, the ICU. But there are contradictory signals from the latter: those leaders of the ICU who went underground have vowed to launch a ‘campaign of resistance’; the others who took refuge in Kenya and the Yemen have expressed their readiness to negotiate. There is real chance for a rapprochement which should not be missed.
However, let us not underestimate the very wide conceptual gap that separates the two sides. Though the TFG may very well negotiate from a point of strength it is scarcely likely that the ICU will give much ground. But with skillful handling of the negotiations it is not altogether impossible for the parties to reach a common ground and thereby spare us yet another round of armed conflict which will drive us and our well-wishers to despair. It is inconceivable and unacceptable that those rogue and unscrupulous warlords are accommodated by the TFG while the ICU luminaries, with all the good deeds that speak for them, are thrown to the wolves. The TFG should seriously consider, inter alia, the setting up of a powerful Council of Religious Affairs with a clear mandate and stipendiary positions in order to accommodate the scholars of the ICU. I do earnestly hope that wiser counsels will prevail and that an amalgam of TFG/ICU Administration will emerge.
I am optimistic – and incorrigibly so – that sense will prevail and we will soon be talking about the reconstruction of our ship of state which will probably be renamed as the “Islamic Republic of Somalia”. We will pin our hopes on that ship of state and will then have reason to utter in our own gabay – or even sing in Somali – the following lines of Longfellow’s:
“Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!
Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate! “
Somalia! By Any Manner of Means
Ismail Ali Ismail
24 January 2007
“In friendship false, implacable in hate:
Resolv’d to ruin or to rule the state.”
Dryden
Background
Few, if any, will doubt that the above quotation is an apt description of our Somali war-lords. It may be argued that the war-lords, scavenging on the remains of our ruined State, were the product of a vacuum created by the inability of the clan- based liberation fronts to come together and lay new foundations for a state which would be in accord with their own vision. Alas, they had no vision of their own beyond sweeping out the regime of Siad Barre, and did not, apparently, foresee the necessity of forging a state together.
The task of toppling a deeply entrenched dictatorial and repressive regime was, obviously, so absorbing that it eclipsed all that was supposed to follow its successful accomplishment. In the event, confusion reigned as happens in all such situations. The gruesome events that followed the demise of the Bourbons in the French Revolution (1789) were termed “ The Reign of Terror”. And there were two ‘kinds’ of terror in Ethiopia following the so-called ‘creeping revolution’ of the Dergue that overthrew the aged and senile Emperor Haile Sellassie in 1974. The Dergue manged to settle in authority only after shedding so much blood in 1976 and 1977 through its massive campaign of “Red Terror” conducted under the pretext of countering a “White Terror” unleashed by its opponents.
By contrast, the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF for short) entered Addis Ababa in May 1991 in a very methodical, organized and (to a large extent) peaceful manner. They came in one late afternoon and, except for sporadic gun fire, Addis Ababa fell quietly. It was amazing: the final stage of regime change in Ethiopia seemed orderly and orchestrated, and it looked as if we were simply witnessing a change of the guard. It is important to remember, for the purpose of analysis, that the EPRDF was an umbrella organization comprising: (a) Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization; (b) Amhara National Democratic Movement; (c) South Ethiopian Peoples’ Democratic Front; and (d) Tigrean Peoples’ Liberation Front. Clearly, they were all, like ours, ethnically based. Incidentally, I happened to witness all these vicissitudes.
Ours movements were: (a) the SSDF of Darood; (b) the SNM of Isaaq; (c) the USC of Hawiye; and (d) SPM of
Darood. Although it seemed that they all shared the common goal of overthrowing the Siad Barre regime they themselves were not really on speaking terms and did not trust each other. Even Aideed and Abdullahi Yusuf, long time comrades in arms, friends of long standing, colleagues and cell-mates in their long incarceration could be seen in the corridors of the Ghion in Addis Ababa trading hateful glances, not because they had personal grievances against each other but because one was Darood and the other Hawiye. Such unfortunate circumstances stood in the way of forming an umbrella organization to coordinate the policies and streamline the fighting strategies of the Somali movements. A major contributory factor to the collapse of the Somali State was also the disintegration of its military even before the regime finally crumbled.
Ali Mahdi was proclaimed President in Magadishu by a small group who gathered around him immediately after the downfall of the regime. But he was confirmed later by the first Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 1991. The problem, however, was that Aideed would not let anyone other than himself have the presidency and fighting ensued between Aideed and Ali Mahdi. The conflict continued and war-lords mushroomed. Later on, Aideed proclaimed himself President and established a broad-based government called “sal-ballaadh” which contained elements from all clans but was not recognized. But the conflict did not stop and Aideed fell in the process.
In 2000 the TNG was born of another reconciliation meeting, also in Djibouti. Abdulqassim Salaad was elected, through a free and fair and transparent process, as President and gained thereby international legitimacy but was unable to bring the war-lords within the fold of his government; nor was he able to unite and bring the capital city under the control of his Administration.
Now there is the TFG which was born of a two-year arduous process of interclan consultations, negotiations and haggling as a result of which a Parliament was formed and Abdullahi Yusuf was elected as the transitional President of the Republic in a process that was also free and fair and transparent. But the TFG had no resources, no army or police, and was unable to settle in the capital where everyone was fighting everyone else including the war-lords who had been appointed ministers but were still wreaking havoc in the city; it also had too many enemies from within and without who spared no effort to bring it down. And then of course there was that vulpine Speaker of Parliament, Sharif Hassan Sheikh Adan, who could not lead his Parliament but always remained a thorn on the side of government’s flesh because of his scheming nature and continual encroachments upon its territory. The Sharif , although Speaker of Parliament, was heart and soul with the forces of discord, of disunity, of death and darkness – the war-lords who broke away from the government. And after he and the President patched their differences it did not take him too long to decamp to the ICU. By running with the hares and the hunting with the hounds the Sharif laid bare the true nature of his character which finally led to him being voted as Speaker of Parliament. Such a character cannot be an asset to any side of the political divide.
These adverse circumstances notwithstanding the TFG was required to bear the heavy burden of reconciliation single-handedly and to install a federal system within a matter of only two years in a country that was tearing itself apart. And of course it could not have acquitted itself of these tasks. Sadly, even some of our so-called intellectuals were and still remain only too eager to criticize, to ridicule and to point to the ineffectiveness of the TFG. But what have these bystanders themselves done to help their country? Any one possessed of normal intellectual faculties can understand that only a robust (not weak) government can undertake the monumental tasks of bringing about peace, reconciliation and the restoration of services.
The Advent of Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU)
Last year the Islamic Courts’ Union (ICU) appeared out of nowhere on the scene of conflict in Mogadishu and, inevitably, went into head-on collisions with the multiplicity of long-established war-lords. Fortunately, they prevailed and sent the war-lords fleeing to the four corners of the earth; then they cleared the city of all the malcontents: road-blockers, thieves, robbers, rapists, prostitutes, etc. They restored peace in full measure – a badly needed service which the TFG sitting in Baidoa could not, obviously, provide by the use of remote control. Even houses illegally occupied were restored to their rightful owners without fuss or quibble. Indeed that was the time I should have gone to Mogadishu to reclaim my house which has been illegally occupied throughout this long period of turmoil.
Under the control of the ICU Mogadishu was transformed overnight from a burning hell to a haven of peace. And the womenfolk took upon themselves to clean the streets off the garbage and filth that had accumulated. In the olden days, Mogadishu used to be praised by its foreign visitors for being clean, peaceful, friendly and reasonably cheap. Despite the rabble and the destruction of buildings and physical infrastructure the ICU restored to the city the main essentials of its original features. Anyone who had veritable Somali blood running in his veins must have then felt proud of ICU’s singular achievements.
The ICU, by its sudden appearance and its achievements, gave a jolt to the legal government sitting in Baidoa but moved quickly to assure it of recognition and collaboration. We all read that assurance as the beginning of an approaching end of hostilities in the country, and a flurry of diplomatic activities brought the two sides (TFG and ICU) together in Khartoum.
Opportunities Lost
The first round of Khartoum was not only encouraging but also euphoric. The two parties met like brothers who have not met for a long time and were too eager to meet. The hugs, the kissings, the broad smiles, the gigglings and the exchange of jokes and kind words, all pointed towards successful negotiation. When they settled down to serious business, however, their differences surfaced up. The TFG wanted to discuss the political issues first and then go into the question of power sharing, The ICU wanted to discuss the issue of ‘security’ first and, having settled that, come to the political issues and, subsequently, power sharing, The TFG was of the view that once political issues have been agreed upon and power sharing achieved the security issues would even cease to be issues for obvious reasons. In the event the two sides agreed only to meet again after consultations with their respective superiors. But the meeting ended on a good note.
However, the ICU started expanding to the areas adjoining the capital and continued even further into the hinterland until one day they dared make an incursion into Bur Hakaba – a mere ----kms. to Baidoa – an event which raised alarm in the TFG causing it to call for Ethiopian reinforcements to deter the ICU. The ICU was incensed at the sight of Ethiopian forces on Somali territory which provided them with an excuse to break the negotiation. But the two sides went nevertheless to Khartoum for the second round but the ICU refused to go into the meeting hall unless Ethiopian forces first withdrew from Somali soil. The TFG retaliated by demanding that the ICU relinquish all the territories it had occupied since the previous meeting. A further but relatively minor complication was also that the ICU objected to IGAD (particularly Kenya) being involved in the mediation, and the TFG objected in turn to the Arab League and Sudan. Had the mediators done their homework such embarrassing developments would have bee avoided. In the event, the mediators could not manage to bring the two parties to one table, and the meeting was adjourned sine die.
The first and second rounds of Khartoum represented golden opportunities that have been squandered and lost. As a matter of fact the ICU had on both occasions the advantage of negotiating from a point of strength. Yet, it was they who squandered both opportunities.
ICU Mistakes And Miscalculations
It is a self-evident fact the ICU made a number of mistakes; and the first mistake related to the composition of its leadership; for its most visible leaders belonged to the same subclan and even the same sub-subclan. It was a mistake on their part to think that religion transcended affiliation and loyalty to the clan particularly, as in their case, where religion and politics were enmeshed. Because of this, many Somalis thought that the ICU contained the seed of its own destruction. The second mistake was its public expression of sentiments regarding the unity, not only of Somalis but also of Moslems in the Horn of Africa as a whole. In Africa there is little, if any, difference between an expression of sentiment and a statement of policy and the pronouncements of ICU sent danger signals to both Ethiopia and Kenya both of which have substantial Somali and Moslem populations. When a regime emerges from the ashes of civil war or as a result of coup d’etat the first thing to do is to assure one’s neighbours of peace and good neighbourliness, and the rest of the world that international treaties and agreements would be observed and respected. The third mistake was to give an ultimatum to Ethiopia and embark on a campaign of rapid expansion to all southern areas culminating in laying siege to the headquarters of the TFG.
The ICU was apparently a collection of religious zealots – a religious fraternity perhaps – who were evidently unschooled in state-craft. They sought to impose on the nation their own vision of an Islamic state but did not know the politics and the mechanics – the nitty-gritty, if you like – of translating their dream into reality.
Restoring Somalia: Does the End Justify the Means?
The TFG, with an ICU knife on its throat, had no option but to defend itself and even call for Ethiopian help and the Ethiopians came with overwhelming military might and helped to crush the ICU militia within a matter of days; and the ICU vanished into thin air. So many thousands of innocent lives have been tragically lost to a reckless military adventure. But that tragedy marks the end of an epoch and the beginning of another. It marks the end of an era of armed confrontations and statelessness and lawlessness and ushers in, hopefully, an era of reconciliation, statehood and stability. As optimists in the Churchillian sense we must find an opportunity in our calamity so that we can move forward towards peace and stability. It is a responsibility we owe to posterity. And we should not flinch from it.
To be fair the TFG had from the very start foreseen the necessity for an African force to be deployed in the country. But, there was stiff opposition from the war-lords, who themselves were cabinet ministers, and the speaker of parliament, who went to great lengths in conniving with them to thwart government policies; it was fiercely opposed even after it was agreed to exclude the neighbouring countries from such a force. The ICG, benefiting from our continuing crisis as usual, fought tooth and nail against such a move. And the ICU, a late-comer to the scene, swore to fight any external force. Furthermore, the Europeans and the Americans said the move was a bad idea and the countries that had promised to contribute to the force developed cold feet. The UN Security Council also prolonged the crisis by playing dilatory tactics but finally ‘lifted’ an arms embargo that was never enforced in the first place. But, curiously enough, there were those among us Somalis who demonstrated a few days ago against the nominal lifting of the embargo but had not even lifted a voice in favour of its enforcement. Why protest against lifting a measure that had not been working anyway? The key to our continuing crisis has always been in our hands but we have permitted others to use it because we ourselves
could not or did not use it.
Only time will tell whether the Ethiopian intervention was good or bad, but the mere fact that it is Ethiopia (and not another country) which intervened created shock waves in many quarters. The reactions have been generally hostile. It is so because Ethiopia is a country many of us still love to hate and is still seen as a “traditional” enemy. I was once told by a Tanzanian lady working for the OAU in Addis Ababa that according to her observation Somalis hated Ethiopians but that Ethiopians did not hate Somalis, and she asked why. I told her of course that Ethiopians connived with the British while we slept, stole our land and ruled our people in the most savage and repressive manner and that that was something that we never did to them. She was satisfied.
But Ethiopia has changed, despite claims to the contrary; and we have changed; and the world around us has changed. For the historical and attitudinal changes which I have personally witnessed in Ethiopia pleased refer to my article in the Wardheernews.com which was published under the date of 06 July 2005 under the caption of “Ethiopia and Somalia: Missed Opportunities and Some Challenges”. Surely, the march of history did not stop in Ethiopia in the 19th or even the 20th century. Nor did it stop in Somalia: look at the changes that occurred to us! Despite our misplaced pride, our homogeneity and our progress in many fields of human endeavour we have deteriorated to a nation in tatters and what the Ethiopians did for us should be viewed as a charity from a kindly neighbour. Our flag was burned only the other day in Hageisa by none other than Somalis; and in full view of a multitude of other Somalis protesting against being Somali – Somalis who would be much happier to be Ethiopians. It is incredible but true! That day will be “ … a day that shall live in infamy”, to borrow the words of Roosevelt. The Ethiopians could have afforded diplomatic recognition to our breakaway region in the Northwest and even lobbied for it with other African countries and AU but were kind enough not to do it. The old Ethiopia (including Mengistu Haile Mariam) would not have hesitated a second to do it.
I think it is completely justifiable to stabalise the country by the use of an external force, and if that force was destined to be Ethiopian, so be it. Now the Ethiopians are withdrawing and there is, all of a sudden, clamour for an African force to replace them. Without a government, without a state, and the paraphernalia of a state, our nationalism will only remain spurious, and we will not be able to raise our heads and walk proudly among free peoples everywhere. Everything therefore must be subordinated to the overriding purpose of getting our Somalia back by any manner of means.
Opportunity Restored
The question facing us now is: where do we go from here now that there is an internationally recognized government sitting for the first time in a long time in our national capital? Do we destroy it or build on it? The TFG has been warming up to the advice rendered by various quarters that it should begin reconciliation in earnest and begin negotiations with its own adversary, the ICU. But there are contradictory signals from the latter: those leaders of the ICU who went underground have vowed to launch a ‘campaign of resistance’; the others who took refuge in Kenya and the Yemen have expressed their readiness to negotiate. There is real chance for a rapprochement which should not be missed.
However, let us not underestimate the very wide conceptual gap that separates the two sides. Though the TFG may very well negotiate from a point of strength it is scarcely likely that the ICU will give much ground. But with skillful handling of the negotiations it is not altogether impossible for the parties to reach a common ground and thereby spare us yet another round of armed conflict which will drive us and our well-wishers to despair. It is inconceivable and unacceptable that those rogue and unscrupulous warlords are accommodated by the TFG while the ICU luminaries, with all the good deeds that speak for them, are thrown to the wolves. The TFG should seriously consider, inter alia, the setting up of a powerful Council of Religious Affairs with a clear mandate and stipendiary positions in order to accommodate the scholars of the ICU. I do earnestly hope that wiser counsels will prevail and that an amalgam of TFG/ICU Administration will emerge.
I am optimistic – and incorrigibly so – that sense will prevail and we will soon be talking about the reconstruction of our ship of state which will probably be renamed as the “Islamic Republic of Somalia”. We will pin our hopes on that ship of state and will then have reason to utter in our own gabay – or even sing in Somali – the following lines of Longfellow’s:
“Thou, too, sail on, O Ship of State!
Sail on, O Union, strong and great!
Humanity with all its fears,
With all the hopes of future years,
Is hanging breathless on thy fate! “
Warlodism, Oralism, CLanism and The Murky Waters of Somali History
By Ismail Ali Ismail
June 7, 2005
“Prejudice is the ink with which we write history”
Mark Twain
Wherefore Art Thou History?
Those Somali Anglophiles who must have read Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet will find a familiar ring about this subtitle. I feel much the same way about our history as Juliet did about Romeo when she cried, “Wherefore art thou Romeo”, and I am always bothered whenever I recall the belligerent harangue of a certain Debela Dinsa who, as a member of the Dergue, had been put in charge of mobilizing the Ethiopian masses against our country in the 1977/78 war. In war one can understand the incendiary role of the propaganda machine, but what bothered me most was his well-publicized and so frequently repeated assertion that the war was “between people who have history and people who have no history”. On reflection, however, I find his assertion plausible and I ask myself: ‘Where is our history?'
Haile selassie
Siad Barre
The Ethiopians claim a history of three thousand years even though we know that Abyssinia , the previous name of Ethiopia, was established by Menelik only in the 19 th century. Menelik claimed that Ethiopia extended from Khartoum in the North to Lake Victoria in the South and many Ethiopians believe that to be true. Similarly, Haile Sellassie claimed at one time that Somalia was part of Ethiopia prior to the advent of European colonialism which, as he said, carved up Somalia out of Ethiopian territory. This claim, fictitious though it was, was supported by Sylvia Pankhurst, not only in her book, Somalia, but also in a number of her campaigns in promoting that claim.
We would have probably become Ethiopians had it not been for the SYL which at that crucial time awakened Somali nationalism in all Somali-inhabited areas – including what is now the Somali Regional State of Ethiopia. The British Labor Government had also a different idea – a plan for the formation of a Greater Somalia. That plan was killed at infancy by the Soviet Union. But, the Governor of Somaliland, Sir Gerald Reece (known to the Somalis as Kama Kame) was also fiercely opposed to Ms. Pankhurst and served as her antidote. Prior to his appointment as Governor of Somaliland Sir Gerald was the Provincial Commissioner of the NFD where his pro-Somali leanings were very well-known; for he was an admirer of Lord Delamere, the founder of Kenya, who owed his life to a Somali, called Abdalla Ashour, who saved him from the grip of the lion that was mauling him. Lord Delamere was so grateful that he used to say (and this is documented, by the way) that any colonial officer who disliked Somalis was one who hated him.
Sadly, all that happened in that era is recorded in scattered bits and pieces and in books which have long been out of print. But, we Somalis have been independent and sovereign for nearly half a century. We may dismiss the last fifteen years as sheer wastes, but they are none the less part of our unrecorded historical record. We have been making history all along; for the wheel of history can neither be stopped nor slowed down. But no one can tell the likes of Debela Dinsa when our history began or where they can read about it.
The Makers of Somali History.
Aden Cade Sharmarke
cigal
Our history is made by us but recorded by others piecemeal with all their prejudices, distortions, misconceptions and misunderstanding. World historians showed no interest because in their eyes Somalia, unlike Egypt for example, was never fertile or rich in history. To my knowledge there are no Somali historians, excepting Professor Sa'id Samatar, though there are quite a few Somalis who specialized in history as a subject. It is my view that to read history is quite different from becoming a historian, but I do appreciate the enormous difficulties that discourage our history specialists from rising to the challenge of writing our history. The dearth of historical material comes readily to mind. Even whatever little we had of colonial records have been permanently locked away and allowed to be devoured and reduced to dust by the termites. Those records were, of course, of no value to our policymakers who were largely uneducated and some of whom were even barely literate. And those very few administrators who were literate enough to make use of those files, surveys, studies and other documents merely succumbed to the oral tradition which made them averse to reading and researching.
It has been alleged that Bille Rafle incinerated, when military governor of Hargeisa, the “entire collection of the library” which the British bequeathed to the new State because, being, as charged, an “ignorant” person ( jaahil ) he could not understand that he was setting a national treasure – something of a heritage – on fire. The truth is that the British did not leave anything of value for us. First, they burnt, with some justification, all the important, sensitive and therefore secret files which would have given us some valuable insights into their designs and policies. Secondly, they left some open and confidential files which gave no inkling as to their secrets. Thirdly, they also left behind few journals and books of a general nature and stocked them in a very small room which they called “Secretariat Library”. Scarcely anyone made use of that room since the British left. I even doubt that it was ever opened, except on rare occasions when somebody would venture inside to see what was available. I first saw this library in 1960 when I started my service with the Somali government in Hargeisa upon graduation from secondary school in Aden . It was then in a very good shape. I also saw the ‘library' on a number of occasions when I was District Commissioner of Hargeisa in the mid 60s and found it to be in a sorry state. But when I approached Bille in 1975 to let me borrow some of the reports or documents he told me “that place is a stinking garbage; what can you get from it?” I insisted and managed to get two reports on salary surveys and a dilapidated and torn copy each of the Local Authority Ordinance of 1952 and the Indian Law of Evidence which I have kept since then. Bille and I have been on the best of terms since the days we served together in Burao – he as the military governor and I (a civilian) as his deputy. Those were the days when the top positions in the field administration were the exclusive preserve of military officers.
This story, however, does not only exonerate Bille but it also demonstrates, like so many other stories, which are without any foundation whatsoever, how events are misconstrued or distorted by people who neither witnessed them nor heard them from authentic sources. I sometimes wonder in total amazements how young people write distorted versions of our history in the websites, and I have seen contradictory accounts being portrayed as authentic historical rendering.
I do not blame those people, for the fault lies , first and foremost with those who themselves made history but left nothing in terms of written memoirs or even oral recordings for posterity. I have in mind people like Abdullahi Isse, Mohammed Haji Hussein, Adan Abdulle Osman, Mohammed Ibrahim Egal, Abdurazak Haji Hussein, Abdurasheed Ali Sharmarke, Ahmed Haji Du'ale, Michael Mariano, Jama Abdullahi Ghalib and others who made history and have not left anything for us. Some of them are still with us in fact and can be and should be persuaded to leave something of a heritage for the country. I remember having a post-prandial conversation with the late Michael Mariano in my home in Addis Ababa some decades ago in the course of which I earnestly asked him to pass on his rich historical experience to the younger generations but he complained about the government putting obstacles in his way. I had a similar discussion with Jama Abdullahi Ghalib (first Speaker of our National Assembly) who now lives in Lusaka ( Zambia ). Jama and I became good friends (although we belong to two different generations) when I took up residence in Zambia upon transfer from Addis Ababa in 1998. He has a lot of history to tell, but he was not also in the mood of leaving anything behind. I understand that the late Mr. Egal left behind so many historical documents which are now in the possession of his widow. Someone, perhaps his children, should weave the various parts together and give us a coherent historical record from the perspective of the late Mr. Egal. Luckily we also have living historical repositories in Abdurazak Haji Hussein and Ahmed Haji Du'ale. Both live in the United States and have the facilities to enable them give us their versions of history. But I think it is safe to assume that because of his advanced age former President Adan Abdulle Osman is not in a position to write or even dictate his contribution. Maybe his sons are in a position to write about their father just the same way Margaret Truman wrote about her father- President Harry S. Truman.
But twenty-one years of military rule must have their place of history. The primary source for this period is, without question, those members of the Supreme Revolutionary Council who are still alive. We need someone who can tell us objectively how the revolution was planned and executed and the role, if any, of the Soviet Union in it. A key figure is, of course, Gen. Mohammed Ali Samatar who was as instrumental in changing the direction of the country as he was in the military buildup. He also directed the war with Ethiopia and entered into negotiations to reassure and neutralize the Soviet Union. That was a time when the West was also keen to extricate Somalia from the Soviet block and was believed by to have made some overtures to the Somali regime which the latter was not quick enough to grasp. Ali Samatar was privy to and a key player in all that happened behind the curtains in that crucial period when huge and more powerful forces were arrayed against us comprising Soviet generals and materiel as well as South Yemeni and Cuban forces beside the Ethiopians. After our defeat – we prefer to call it withdrawal – an Ethiopian colleague said to me jokingly, “ Ismail, we taught you Somalis a lesson” and I replied to him, also jokingly, “Yes, but the lesson was in Russian, not in Amharic”. He looked at me and simply walked away.
Today, all I read about that war was that the Ethiopians routed the Somalis. Ethiopian academics spread that lie every day. We never see a Somali version of that bit of our history anywhere; even Somali writers echo the same lies. Ali Samatar can put the record straight by providing a written and authoritative account of what actually happened. We also need to know – and posterity will need to know – his answer to the serious accusations that have been laid to his account, particularly in so far as the strafing from the air of women and children fleeing from the fighting in Hargeisa was concerned. The public have heard from the accusing side and it is only fair to hear also from Ali Samatar. He is gifted with cogent reasoning and lucidity of presentation, and he can surely make a great contribution in filling the yawning gap in our history. It cannot be gainsaid that our leaders – military and civilians alike – have put a lid on our history and by so doing have kept us in the dark. We badly need explanations and clarifications; otherwise, rumors will establish themselves as history.
An example of this is a story which was circulated in the sixties within the informed circles of our society to the effect that when the late Abdullahi Isse was in Rome in late 1962 or early 63 negotiating, as foreign minister, the transfer of the NFD with his British interlocutor the British offered us three instead of the six districts. It is said that Abdullahi was inclined to accept the proposed compromise except that the late Abdurasheed Ali Sharmarke who was Prime Minister then flew all the way from China where he was visiting to Rome where he joined the talks and took the position of ‘all or nothing'. The talks broke down as a result and we ended up with nothing. I have also been told that Kenneth Kaunda in his later efforts to mediate between Somalia and Kenya managed to convince Mr. Kenyatta to give away the three purely Somali districts in Northern Kenya to Somalia . But, I am told, when the two sides (the Somali side and the Kenyan) met in Arusha Mr. Egal forestalled the process of negotiation by making a hasty declaration that Somalia had no claim against Kenya. I am told Kenyatta was so ecstatic that he jumped to his feet and embraced Mr. Egal calling him “My Brother”, that and one could see Kenyatta shedding tears of joy. The Arusha Memorandum of Understanding of 1967 actually states that the dispute between the two countries would be solved amicably. The text of the Memorandum contradicts this story. However, I am not sure if the two leaders met again, but if the storey is true (and the person who told me says he heard it from Kaunda himself) it would mean that the same opportunity presented itself once more and was bungled by a Prime Minister. I cannot say whether any of these two stories is authentic or apocryphal but they underscore the fact that we have no factual accounts to go by.
Another group that can shed some light on the happenings of those two decades of military rule are those civilians who served as ministers in that era. None of them – with the sole and single exception of Jama Mohammed Ghalib – wrote anything about that period. It has been said that “History is nothing more than the defamation of the dead” and this more true where dictators are concerned. It is safe now to write anything about that period but if a writer elicits some bitterness the intelligent reader will still be able to see the wood for the trees. Bitterness, like lavish praise, will, without doubt, detract from the quality of the work and should be avoided. In any case, we need this group to give us and the future generations the benefit of their experience.
The Collaborators of the History Makers
This group comprises the higher civil servants such as permanent secretaries, ambassadors, legal experts, advisers and in some instances party functionaries. Here is a class of old fogies who can help us narrow our historical gap. They did not only help the politicians to make history but they also have what many of the politicians lacked: the ability to write and analyze. They are better educated and many have coupled solid experience with their university education and/or professional qualifications. Nor were they constrained by an official secrets act as are British civil servants. Sadly, again, none of them gave us the benefit of his or her experience. Here in the United States we all know that officials give their own versions of history; examples abound: Harry Hopkins, Sorenson, Schlesinger, Kissinger, Brezezinski and so many others all wrote about the historical events they were party witnesses to. In our case, I think Ambassador Ahmed Mohammed Adan (Qaybe) was privy to many negotiations with the Soviet Union and he was our ambassador to Washington, ambassador to the U.N. and U.K. , permanent secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and last Foreign Minister of the Said Bare regime. I feel sure that he has a lot to tell us. I know he can write and he writes beautifully. He is now making history in Hargeisa and I think he should consider it a national duty to write his memoirs before his pen and his memory run dry. I can also think of Ambassador Abdullahi Sa'id Osman who was privy to many occurrences and has that lawyerly ability to write lucidly and put things into their proper perspective. Ambassador Abdullahi Addo (twice a presidential candidate) was our man in Washington at the crucial time we needed the United States to be on our side – a time when the Carter Administration was divided between helping us and throwing us to the wolves. He too can illuminate many of the dark crevices for us.
What Can We Do?
I think we should take our history seriously. It is important. I know we have destroyed whatever records we had, but at least we have the people who know much about methods and means of historical research and how to get the necessary funding for it. Such people can start the nucleus of a Somali Historical Society. I am thinking about Prof. Sa'id Samatar and Dr. Ali Abdurahman Hersi who can no doubt go into some research and chronicle our history. But there must be many other qualified compatriots who will also consider it a national duty to retrieve and save our history. However, I do not know whether there are any Somali archeologists, but I will be surprised if there are any. Archeology is not a field, I suppose, which can attract Somalis. But if there is sufficient funding and a government that will invite and encourage archeological surveys and excavations we should be able to find new discoveries which can put our country on the maps showing the loci of old human civilizations. Alas, it is not likely for many years or decades to have a Somali government which will take due interest in such matters.
Our oral tradition has cost us a great deal, and the writing of the Somali language in 1972 did not transform us after thirty-three years into a truly literate society. We are just beginning to have newspapers and even books in Somali. But still we are oralists to the bone. I remember visiting a friend in the Presidential Quadrangle in Mogadishu in 1987 and I was petrified by the fact that no typewriters were clicking, no papers were shuffled , no one was drafting anything and no files were visible – things which we usually associate with bureaucrats. The desks were clean and clear of pens, pencils, ink etc. and the “bureaucrats” sitting immobile behind them were sipping tea or coffee or else talking on the telephone. They were the most unbureaucratic bureaucrats I have seen in my long public service. The oral tradition has relegated the mechanics of administration to the past and I knew that that was yet another sign that our State was taking a downward spiral.
The other factor which has a fatal effect on writing our history objectively is clanism. Clan sensibilities are avoided at the cost of the facts or else a clear clan bias is exhibited. And there is always the danger of dismissing objective accounts as expressions of clan prejudice. Our educated men and women are, unfortunately, blindly loyal to their respective clans. It seems that their education was not strong enough to liberate them from the shackles of the clan system and to open their minds to the unlimited opportunities we could all have if we widen our horizons and work in unison. It is not possible to write our history without the mention of clans and even when we write a critical essay about a national figure his clansmen and clanswomen will be offended. Clanism continues to cloud our judgment. Those who praise Sayid Mohammed Abdalle Hassan to the sky are blind to his faults; conversely, those who see him as a villain are blind to his virtues. What is interesting is that the division is along clan lines – and so it is with other persons of stature as well. Can we then objectively write our history? My answer is ‘yes'. The History Society can play a role in this by vetting submissions, by seeing to it that claims and counterclaims are fully substantiated and by arranging scholarly debates. I think this is one way of getting around the clan bias. But the Historical Society itself must enjoy a reputation for fairness and scholarly search for the truth.
The warlords are a new and hopefully transient phenomenon. But I think the less said about them the better. Warlords will themselves pass into history soon but it will not be easy for the present generation of Somalis to write objectively about them because objective writing requires some degree of detachment. Similarly, we are unable to write dispassionately about Siad Barre and his regime even though we have welcomed to our midst and accommodated those closest collaborators of his who belong to our respective clans. Time will see to it that passions dissipate and cool heads prevail and future historians will give their generations and the generations that follow them unsanitised accounts of our history.
Finally, one of the main reasons that impelled me to write this article is the failure to respect our time-honored tradition of passing our experience from generation to generation. Nowhere is this failure more apparent than in the contributions some of our young people send to the websites. It is as if these young people have not been told anything at all about how and why things happened. For instance, there are those who contend that the North in its entirety rejected the constitution in the referendum of 1961. I served as the chairman of one of two polling stations in Las Anod (now Sool) at that time and the vote for the constitution was truly overwhelmingly. The constitution was similarly approved by Borama/Zeila (now the Awdal Region) and by what is now Eastern Sanaag . Only the rest of the North overwhelmingly rejected the constitution. The voting laid bare the clan divisions in the North and was revealing of the political alliances that existed then. But the constitutional referendum itself had nothing to do with the union between the North and the South. Furthermore, it was contended by one of the contributors that the late Ian MacLeod, the then Secretary of State for the Colonies wisely advised the Somaliland delegation not to enter into a hasty union with Somalia . I have no doubt that this is true, but the Italians too were giving the same advice to their friends in Somalia.
These machinations were known to the public as a concerted ploy to forestall the union and if Egal and his ministers had heeded the advice of the British Colonial Secretary they would have been stoned at the airport in Hargeisa upon arrival; for such was the mood of the public. The British, perhaps feeling guilty about having neglected the Cinderella of the British Empire (as Somaliland was nicknamed then), had asked earlier to stay on for eight more years in order to build the country and prepare it for the challenges of independence. This was turned down because the British had been perfidious as evidenced by their transfer of the ‘Haud and Reserved Area' to Ethiopia . It is interesting to know that British had asked the Indians about a decade earlier for an extension in India on the same grounds to which Nehru replied, ‘I have never heard of a vegetarian tiger'. I am not talking here about the merits or demerits of secession; that is a different issue altogether, but we have a responsibility to set the record straight for our younger generations.
But, if the generation that led us to independence and those who came after them did not leave any records behind, they did not proffer their experience and wisdom to the rest of us orally either. I therefore sense that there is a gap in the communication between the generations, which I think is wrong and dangerous. I think further that the websites can play a significant role in facilitating the dialogue between generations. The break in communication is partly due to the older generations' feeling that the articles published on the websites are merely idle talk which some of them, incidentally, are. Others may think that it is below their dignity to argue with the age cohorts of their children or their grand children. They could not be more wrong. I recommend that the websites should rise to the challenge and promote a dialogue between the generations.
E-mail: geeldoonia@gmail.com
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